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1. Introduction 
The most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, as a backbone of policy discipline for 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), has been strictly implemented, particularly for import tariffs. The privilege of 
enjoying MFN status has provided a strong incentive for developing countries to 
participate in GATT/WTO. Tariff reductions under WTO, however, have not been well 
advanced in the Doha Development Agenda. As a result, most countries around the 
world have started to aggressively exploit the “exceptions” to the MFN principle. 
There are three major forms of exception to the MFN principle on tariffs. The first 
is regional trade agreements (RTAs), including free trade areas and customs unions. 
GATT Article XXIV allows RTAs as exceptions to the MFN principle under loosely 
specified conditions. The number of RTAs has increased explosively since the 1990s. 
The second exception is the generalized system/scheme of preferences (GSP). Under the 
initiative of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
GSP started in 1970 as another exception to the MFN principle so that developed 
countries can grant preferential status to developing countries’ exports. The third 
exception includes various special trade arrangements for export processing zones, 
offshoring operations, and duty-drawback systems. 
For both academics and policymakers, it is important to quantify the extent of 
such preferential tariff utilization. A traditional trade economist supporting the MFN 
principle may want to know the extent to which actual trade deviates from the MFN 
principle. Policymakers may, once the GSP or RTAs are prepared, certainly want to 
quantify the extent to which the preferential scheme is actually utilized. The utilization 
of preferential tariffs under RTAs and GSP is not automatic; preferential tariffs are 
applied only when imported products clear the rules of origin. As a result, some 
exporters may still trade under general tariff schemes, such as MFN rates, if they 
consider it difficult or costly to prove their products’ origins. 
We have tried to measure preferential tariff utilization in various ways. A typical 
measure is the share of trade that uses preferential tariffs out of total trade.1 Several 
studies have reported such shares for various preferential schemes: (1) GSP granted by 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to developing countries in the 
agricultural goods sector (Bureau et al., 2007), (2) preferences granted by the EU to 
non-least-developed African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries under the Cotonou 
                                                   
1 Some variations exist in the measure of preference utilization. One issue is whether or not to 
exclude trade in products that are ineligible for preference schemes in the denominator. For more 
details, see Keck and Lendle (2012). 
3 
 
Agreement (Francois et al., 2006; Manchin, 2006), (3) GSP granted by the US to 143 
countries (Hakobyan, 2015), (4) bilateral and multilateral RTAs when exporting from 
Thailand to Japan (Hayakawa, 2014), and (5) RTA schemes applicable to exports from 
ASEAN countries to Korea (Hayakawa et al., 2014). For example, Hayakawa et al. 
(2014) showed that for exports to Korea in 2011, the utilization ratio of the ASEAN–
Korea free trade agreement was 74% for Brunei, 63% for Indonesia, 67% for Cambodia, 
44% for Lao PDR, 96% for Myanmar, 35% for Malaysia, 42% for Philippines, 35% for 
Thailand, and 78% for Vietnam. 
A crucial shortcoming of the preference utilization ratio lies in the difficulty in 
obtaining the necessary data. Its computation requires data on trade values classified by 
tariff schemes such as RTA, GSP, and MFN. Almost all countries other than the US and 
those in the EU do not publicly disclose such data.2 Such data are available only for 
limited purposes, such as pure academic research. As a result, the extent of preference 
utilization variation across countries remains unknown. 
This study proposes a powerful alternative measure of preferential tariff 
utilization in each country’s imports.3 It offers the unique advantage of only requiring 
publicly available data in its computation. Specifically, we employ data on total 
government revenues from import duties. Such data are often used for computing the 
“tariff burden ratio,” which can be a proxy for import duties. It is computed by dividing 
total government revenues from import duties by total imports. 4 Our measure of 
preference utilization is (one minus) the share of “actual government revenues from 
import duties” in “the hypothetical total government revenues from import duties,” the 
latter of which are the import-weighted average of MFN rates multiplied by total 
imports. Namely, it measures the share of exempted duties out of the total tariff 
revenues that would have been obtained if all imports had been under MFN rates. 
Naturally, the utilization of RTA or GSP schemes raises the exempted duties. In addition, 
if a country introduces other tariff exemption schemes, such as duty drawbacks for 
re-exports, the magnitude of exempted duties becomes larger in that country. We call 
this measure the “tariff exemption ratio” and compute it by employing only publicly 
available international databases, i.e., World Development Indicators (WDI) and the 
OECD iLibrary. Thus, this measure can be calculated for almost all countries in the 
                                                   
2 Recently, the Japanese Government also disclosed data on imports under RTA schemes but not on 
those under the GSP scheme. 
3 We focus on the import side because it is generally difficult to measure preference utilization on 
the export side. For more details, see Hayakawa et al. (2013). 
4 Also, revenue data are employed to examine the relationship between tax revenue and trade 
liberalization in some studies (Khattry and Rao, 2002; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006; Baunsgaard and Keen, 
2010; Hisali, 2012). 
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world for either cross-country or time-series comparisons. 
Our tariff exemption ratio can be interpreted as a proxy for the extent of 
preference utilization for imports of products with positive MFN rates. By definition, 
the utilization of preferences for products with zero MFN rates does not affect the tariff 
exemption ratio because it is based on the extent to which import duties are exempted 
by importing under preferential rates compared with importing under MFN rates. After 
all, from the viewpoint of measuring the utilization of preference schemes, the 
preference utilization ratio works better because it identifies the preference utilization 
based only on whether or not such preference schemes are in fact utilized. On the other 
hand, the tariff exemption ratio is a better measure from the viewpoint of gauging the 
extent of giving tariff advantages to preference partners or how far preference partners 
enjoy tariff exemptions. In this sense, these two measures will be complementary. 
We conduct several analyses on the calculated tariff exemption ratios. First, as we 
can access the necessary data for Thailand, we calculate both the preference utilization 
ratio and the tariff exemption ratio for comparison. The results indicate that when 
computing these ratios for products with positive MFN rates in Thailand, their values 
become almost identical. Second, computing the tariff exemption ratio for a large 
number of countries (112 countries), we take an overview of differences in preference 
utilization across countries. Third, we examine the correlation of the tariff exemption 
ratio with various elements. For example, because countries conducting large 
transactions with RTA partners are supposed to use the tariff exemption scheme more, 
the tariff exemption ratio should be positively correlated with the share of total 
intra-block imports. The tariff exemption ratio should also have a positive correlation 
with preference margins (i.e., the difference between MFN and preferential rates). The 
aforementioned studies on the preference utilization ratio have consistently shown that 
for imports by each specific country, the extent of preference utilization is positively 
associated with preference margins. Our result confirms that such a positive relationship 
exists in a large number of countries. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section provides the 
specific definition of our tariff exemption ratio. In Section 3, employing data on imports 
according to tariff schemes for Thailand, we examine the performance of this measure 
by comparing it with the preference utilization ratio. Section 4 computes tariff 
exemption ratios for a large number of countries. Section 5 examines the correlation of 
our tariff exemption ratio with various elements. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Tariff Exemption Ratio 
We consider the utilization of preferences for a country’s total imports, not its 
imports from a specific country. When measuring the utilization of preferences, the 
following measure is often employed (country subscript is omitted): 
𝑉 ≡
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑃
𝑖
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑀
𝑖 + ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖 ,                                                          (1) 
where IiM and IiP are import values of product i under MFN schemes and preferential 
schemes, respectively. This measure, called the “preference utilization ratio,” shows the 
share of preferential imports out of total imports. On the other hand, the measure 
proposed in this paper is called the “tariff exemption ratio” and is given by 
𝐸 ≡ 1 − ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑀(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃)𝑖 ,                                              (2) 
where tiM and tiP are MFN tariff rates and preferential rates, respectively. While the 
numerator in the second term shows total government revenues from import duties, the 
denominator indicates MFN rates multiplied by total imports. In other words, the latter 
shows the total tariff revenues that would have been obtained if all imports had occurred 
under MFN rates, i.e., the hypothetical tariff revenues earned for all imports. 
     We can get a clearer insight on the tariff exemption ratio by further simplifying 
the above formulation as follows: 
𝐸 = ∑ (𝑡𝑖𝑀 − 𝑡𝑖𝑃)𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑀(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃)𝑖 .                                                         (3) 
The difference between MFN and preferential rates is called a “tariff margin” or a 
“preference margin.” The numerator shows how much tariff revenue is lost by 
importing under preferential schemes. As a result, it measures the share of exempted 
duties out of total potential tariff revenue.5 
This measure seems to be well related to the preference utilization ratio. Indeed, it 
is easily proven that E is completely equal to V if tiP = 0 and tiM = t for all i. If MFN 
rates differ by products, the difference between these two measures becomes 
𝐸 − 𝑉 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑀𝑖 ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖 − ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖 ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑀𝑖(∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖 )(∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖 ).                         (4) 
The numerator becomes either positive or negative, depending on, for example, 
differences in MFN rates or imports across products. In addition, when preferential rates 
are not zero, the difference between the two measures emerges.6 
                                                   
5 One may think that the sum of imports multiplied by preferential rates or applied tariff rates would 
also yield valuable information. However, these rates cannot be easily collected. In particular, the 
publicly available data on applied tariff rates do not take GSP rates into account. 
6 In order to more precisely analyze how MFN or preferential rates affect the difference between 
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Another important issue concerns zero MFN rates. As it is clear from equation (1), 
including products with zero MFN rates in computing the preference utilization ratio 
increases imports under MFN rates in the denominator. It may also increase preferential 
imports particularly in the case of RTAs with cumulation rules because firms have 
incentive to import products under those RTA schemes even when tariff rates are zero 
(notice that preferential rates are also zero for products with zero MFN rates), in order 
to enjoy cumulation rules (see, for example, Hayakawa et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
as is evident from equations (2) and (3), the inclusion of such products does not affect 
tariff exemption ratio levels at all. Thus, the tariff exemption ratio should be interpreted 
as showing the extent of preference utilization only for imports of products with 
positive MFN rates. Therefore, when examining the time-series changes in tariff 
exemption ratios, we should take great care of possibly different sets of zero-MFN-rate 
products over time.7 
For later use, the tariff exemption ratio E multiplied by total imports of products 
with positive MFN rates is called exemption-basis preferential imports. The rest of 
imports of products with positive MFN rates are exemption-basis non-preferential 
imports. On the other hand, IM and IP are called utilization-basis non-preferential 
imports and utilization-basis preferential imports, respectively. Obviously, 
exemption-basis preferential imports are not necessarily consistent with utilization-basis 
preferential imports. While the former indicates the magnitude of preferential imports 
evaluated based on the magnitude of exempted tariff revenues, the latter’s evaluation is 
based on whether or not preference schemes are utilized. Using these terms, we can say 
that our tariff exemption ratio is the share of exemption-basis preferential imports out of 
total imports of products with positive MFN rates, while the preferential utilization ratio 
is the share of utilization-basis preferential imports. 
     The tariff exemption ratio offers a remarkable advantage in practice. Calculating 
the preference utilization ratio obviously requires data on import values by tariff 
schemes. However, most countries do not disclose such data. On the other hand, we can 
compute the tariff exemption ratio by employing only publicly available data. The 
numerator in the second term in equation (2) is total government revenues from import 
duties. If we use the import-weighted average of (applied) MFN rates, the denominator 
                                                                                                                                                     
these two measures, it is necessary to take into account that IiM and IiP are functions of tiM and tiP. 
Namely, we need to specify some theoretical model on firms’ utilization of preferential schemes, as 
in Demidova and Krishna (2008). 
7 Also, imports of products in which preferential rates are equal to MFN rates but are positive do not 
affect the numerator in equation (3). However, since they do affect the denominator, the tariff 
exemption ratio should be interpreted as including the extent of preference utilization in such 
products. 
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becomes the weighted average of MFN rates multiplied by total imports. As a result, 
equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:8  
𝐸 = 1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑓 𝐼𝑓𝐼𝑇𝑓𝑡 𝐷𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑊𝑅𝐷𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑅𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑅 𝑇𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑇𝑡𝑅𝑅) × (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝑓𝐼𝑇𝑓𝑡𝑅).         (5) 
Computing the tariff exemption ratio requires only three sets of data: (1) the weighted 
average of MFN rates, (2) total revenues from import duties, and (3) total imports, all of 
which are available in public databases. Using the definition of tariff burden ratio, we 
may further simplify equation (5) as follows: 
𝐸 = 1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑇𝑡𝐷𝑇
𝑊𝑅𝐷𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑅𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑅 𝑇𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑇𝑡𝑅𝑅 .                             (6) 
     There are three points to be noted in applying equation (5). First, as mentioned 
before, the tariff exemption ratio measures the extent of preference utilization for 
imports of products with positive MFN rates. However, we can still use data on total 
imports, not those on imports in products with positive MFN rates, as long as the 
weighted average of MFN rates among all products is used. Indeed, total imports 
multiplied by the weighted average of MFN rates do not change depending on whether 
or not information for products with zero MFN rates is included. Second, unlike the 
preference utilization ratio, the tariff exemption ratio cannot be calculated on a bilateral 
basis because data on government revenues from import duties are not available by 
trading partners. It may also be impossible to compute it using product-level data. Third, 
we cannot separately measure the utilization of individual preferential schemes 
including RTA schemes, GSP schemes, or various kinds of special trade arrangements 
(e.g., duty-drawback systems). Our tariff exemption ratio measures the utilization of the 
entire preferential scheme. 
 
 
3. Computation for Thailand 
     This section calculates the tariff exemption ratio in Thailand. First, in order to 
check its performance in terms of similarity to the preference utilization ratio, we 
compute and compare these two measures. Next, we demonstrate that the computed 
tariff exemption ratio differs widely across data sources.  
 
3.1. Preference Utilization Ratio versus Tariff Exemption Ratio 
We examine the performance of the tariff exemption ratio by comparing it with 
the preference utilization ratio for Thailand since the data necessary for computing both 
                                                   
8 For more details on the equivalence between equations (2) and (5), see Appendix A. 
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are available for this country. Specifically, we employ the dataset obtained from 
customs in the Kingdom of Thailand. It contains transaction-level import data from 
2007 to 2011 for all commodity imports in Thailand.9 Commodities are classified at a 
harmonized system (HS) eight-digit level. When computing the preference utilization 
ratio, we use the information on imports according to tariff schemes including MFN 
rates, RTA schemes, and other schemes, which include duty-free schemes such as 
investment promotions or duty drawbacks for re-exports. Thus, imports under the latter 
two kinds of schemes are classified as preferential imports.  
When computing the tariff exemption ratio, we directly calculate actual revenues 
from import duties by employing the above-mentioned import data according to tariff 
schemes in addition to the data on tariff rates from customs. Namely, actual customs 
revenues are obtained by multiplying each type of imports by the corresponding tariff 
rates at a tariff line level and aggregating the resulting values. Hypothetical tariff 
revenues are computed by multiplying total imports by MFN rates at a tariff line level 
and aggregating the resulting values. Finally, we obtain the weighted average of MFN 
rates by dividing hypothetical tariff revenues by total imports. Such MFN rates are 
equivalent to weighted-average MFN rates computed using HS eight-digit-level imports 
and MFN rates. 
     The two ratios in Thailand are reported in Table 1. The upper panel shows values 
for all products including products with zero MFN rates. Columns (I)–(III) report 
import values according to three tariff schemes. Column (IV) shows their sum total. The 
figures in these four columns enable us to compute the preference utilization ratio, 
which is reported in column (VIII). It lies in a range of 38% to 44%. The 
import-weighted average of MFN rates is shown in column (V).10 While the actual 
government revenues from import duties are reported in column (VI), the hypothetical 
tariff revenues from total imports are shown in column (VII). The resulting tariff 
exemption ratio is reported in column (IX), and it can be seen that it lies in a range of 
49% to 58%. We can see in the case of all products that the tariff exemption ratio is 
around 10 percentage points higher than the preference utilization ratio. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     The case when products with zero MFN rates are excluded is shown in the lower 
                                                   
9 The same data are used in Hayakawa et al. (2016). 
10 The rise of average MFN rates in Thailand over time is due to the change in imports, i.e., change 
of weight, rather than the rise in MFN rates. 
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panel of Table 1. As mentioned in the previous section, the tariff exemption ratio and 
actual/hypothetical tariff revenues do not change. On the other hand, the import values 
for each tariff scheme decrease naturally. Also, the weighted average of MFN rates will 
increase, though we do not use it here. As a result, the preference utilization ratio rises 
to lie in a range of 45% to 56%. Surprisingly, these preference utilization ratio levels are 
almost the same as those for the tariff exemption ratio. The difference between these 
two kinds of ratios is at most 4 percentage points. Except for the case of 2007, it is only 
0 to 2 percentage points. Thus, at least in the case of Thailand, the tariff exemption ratio 
is almost equal to the preference utilization ratio. 
 
3.2. Sensitivity to Data Sources 
     In the case of Thailand, we obtained customs data; using the complete set of 
disaggregated trade data can yield a clean and precise tariff exemption ratio. However, 
in applying this method to other countries, we have to depend on publicly available 
aggregated figures. In this subsection, we examine the extent to which differences in 
data sources affect the estimated values of tariff exemption ratios. 
The results are reported in Table 2. For comparison, we provide figures in “All 
Products” and “Positive MFN Products” from Table 1 in cases (i) and (ii), respectively. 
In case (iii), we compute the tariff exemption ratio for Thailand by employing the data 
derived only from the WDI.11 Specifically, we obtain data on “Customs and other 
import duties.”12 “Goods imports,” and “Tariff rate, most favored nation, weighted 
mean, all products.” The original source for the data on customs and other import duties 
is the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The original sources for imports and MFN rates are International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) from the IMF and the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
database, 13 respectively. In case (iv), we employ import data obtained from UN 
Comtrade and WDI data for MFN rates and tariff revenues.  
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
                                                   
11 In this table, we restrict the sample years only to 2007–2009 as the data for Thailand in the WDI 
are not available for 2010 and 2011. 
12 The WDI metadata refers that “Customs and other import duties are all levies collected on goods 
that are entering the country or services delivered by nonresidents to residents. They include levies 
imposed for revenue or protection purposes and determined on a specific or ad valorem basis as long 
as they are restricted to imported goods or services.” 
13 However, as mentioned later, MFN rates reported in WDI are quantitatively different from those 
reported in WITS. 
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Since the WDI/Comtrade data are based on those for all products, we should 
compare figures for imports, MFN rates, and tariff revenues in cases (iii) and (iv) with 
those in case (i). Compared with figures derived from the customs data, the values of 
imports are larger in Comtrade and smaller in the WDI (i.e., IFS). Various reasons can 
underlie such differences in total imports. For example, according to the IMF website, 
figures for total imports are not necessarily the same between IFS and UN Comtrade 
since these are based on different data collection systems with different aims, 
procedures, timetables, and sources for updates and maintenance. These differences 
result in gaps in total imports across data sources. 
The weighted average of MFN rates is slightly higher in the WDI (i.e., WITS). 
The main source of this variation may be a difference in aggregation level. According to 
the WDI metadata, tariff rates and the imports used for weight in its data are first 
separately aggregated to a standard international trade classification (SITC) five-digit 
level. Then, the weighted average of MFN rates is computed. On the other hand, as 
mentioned above, our MFN rates are computed by employing HS eight-digit-level data 
of imports and MFN rates. Differences may additionally arise due to the fact that we 
employ tariff-equivalent rates for specific rates in the case of customs data, though it is 
unclear whether or not the WDI data also employ the same rates. 
Revenues from import duties are smaller in the WDI (i.e., GFS). As mentioned in 
the next section, there are several kinds of limitation in revenue data. In addition, when 
we directly compute tariff revenues by multiplying imports by MFN rates, our use of 
tariff-equivalent rates for specific duties may lead to the gap seen in the case of the WDI 
data. Another issue is that the original source of WDI data for both imports and tariff 
revenues is IMF estimates. Thus, in the case of WDI data, lower tariff revenue values 
are consistent with those of imports. In other words, other things being equal, lower 
levels of imports automatically lead to lower tariff revenues. In this sense, as shown 
below, the gap in imports and tariff revenues between WDI and customs data may not 
yield a large difference in the tariff exemption ratio between those two sources. 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the tariff exemption ratio should be 
interpreted as showing the extent of preference utilization in imports only for products 
with positive MFN rates. Thus, the tariff exemption ratio computed using 
WDI/Comtrade data should be compared with the preference utilization ratio and tariff 
exemption ratio in case (ii). The tariff exemption ratio in case (iii) is around 10 
percentage points higher than the preference utilization ratio and the tariff exemption 
ratio in case (ii). The ratio in case (iv) is around 15 percentage points higher. Thus, the 
tariff exemption ratio based on WDI/Comtrade data overestimates the extent of 
11 
 
preference utilization. In other words, the tariff exemption ratio level depends upon the 
data sources used in its computation. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the lesser 
degree of overestimation in case (iii) may be due to the use of WDI data for imports and 
tariff revenues, both of which are IMF estimates. Thus, we should avoid a mix of data 
sources when computing the tariff exemption ratio. 
 
 
4. Tariff Exemption Ratios around the World 
     This section presents the tariff exemption ratio for most countries. First, we 
introduce the ratio computed by employing only data from well-known databases. Next, 
to improve its accuracy, we compute it by employing another data source of the 
weighted average of MFN rates. 
 
4.1. Use of the WDI Database 
In this subsection, we employ two databases to compute tariff exemption ratios. 
One is the WDI. The specific variables obtained from the WDI are the same as those 
used for the case of Thailand in the previous subsection: “Customs and other import 
duties,” “Goods imports,” and “Tariff rate, most favored nation, weighted mean, all 
products.” The other data are taken from the OECD iLibrary. Despite our earlier caveat 
about mixing data sources, the absence of data on customs and other import duties for 
most European countries in the WDI means we must employ another publicly available 
database, OECD iLibrary. We employ data on customs and other import duties in the 
OECD iLibrary for all OECD countries. Specifically, we use data on “5123 Customs 
and import duties” and “Custom duties collected for the EU” in the Revenue Statistics 
from OECD Tax Statistics. Since we employ the latest data available in each country, 
the sample year differs by country. 
There are some shortcomings in the data on customs and other import duties. First, 
while many countries report customs duties by fiscal year, other data, such as import 
data, are reported by calendar year. In this sense, some gaps in values will exist between 
these data. Second, if the duty paid in a year is refunded in the next year, the tariff 
exemption ratio does not necessarily indicate the use of preference in that year. Third, 
some countries do not consolidate central and local government finance data into one 
account and present only central government budgetary accounts. In the case of customs 
and other import duties, even central government budgetary accounts will show the 
whole picture, but we will address this issue later. Due to these various sources of noise, 
the tariff exemption ratio becomes too large or negative for a few countries. We exclude 
12 
 
countries with such ratios (i.e., greater than 1.05 or negative). As a result, 12 countries 
are excluded. We set 1 if the ratio lies in the range of 1 to 1.05. 
     We compute the tariff exemption ratio for 112 countries. The ratio for each 
country is shown in column “WDI” in Table 3. 14 We report sample year, tariff 
exemption ratio, and the weighted average of MFN rates. Countries with ratio values of 
one are small countries in the EU. If those countries import goods only from other EU 
members, the tariff exemption ratio may take the value of one. However, such a case 
would be rare. Rather, ratios with a value of one would arise because of the 
above-mentioned minor errors in tariff revenues. In any case, those countries do have 
tariff exemption ratios close to the value of one. On the other hand, countries with zero 
ratios are small island countries. In contrast to the cases with a ratio of one, zero ratios 
are likely to exist. For example, some countries may not offer any preferential schemes 
to exporters. In this case, the tariff exemption ratio is always zero.15 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     The basic statistics for global tariff exemption ratios are provided in Table 4. The 
sample mean is 0.54 while the standard deviation is 0.32.16 In the table, ratios are also 
shown by region. In terms of simple means, Europe has the highest ratio, followed by 
East or Southeast Asia and North America. In the 2000s, ASEAN members formed 
regional agreements with major trading partners, i.e., Australia, China, India, Japan, 
Korea, and New Zealand. Korea also actively conducts RTAs with its major trading 
partners including not only Asian countries but also the U.S. and European countries. 
These active RTA formations lead to high tariff exemption ratios in East or Southeast 
Asia. On the other hand, Africa, South or West Asia, and the countries in the Pacific 
                                                   
14 The kernel density of the tariff exemption ratio is shown in Figure B1. 
15 Using figures for the preference utilization ratio in Keck and Lendle (2012), we can check the 
differences between our tariff exemption ratio and the preference utilization ratio in various 
countries. Specifically, Table 1 in Keck and Lendle (2012) showed import values according to tariff 
schemes (i.e., MFN, RTA, and GSP) and MFN rates (i.e., zero or positive) in Australia, Canada, and 
the US (and EU) in 2008. The preference utilization ratio for products with positive MFN rates is 
18% in Australia, 70% in Canada, and 55% in the US. On the other hand, tariff exemption ratios in 
2008 were 20% in Australia, 75% in Canada, and 56% in the US. Therefore, the difference between 
the two measures is surprisingly small in these countries. 
16 In order to minimize errors from the use of data in specific years, we also compute tariff 
exemption ratios by employing the latest three-year average of each variable. Since the data are 
available for only one or two years in some countries, the number of countries for which we can 
compute the ratio is reduced to 71. We also compute statistics for the same set of countries 
employing data from the latest single year. As a result, the mean values are almost identical between 
these two cases (0.59 for a three-year average or 0.58 for a single year), though the case of the 
three-year average (0.32) shows a smaller standard deviation than the case of a single year (0.34). 
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have relatively small means of tariff exemption ratios. In these regions, preference 
schemes are not widely utilized in trading. In particular, among Pacific countries, 
Australia and Vanuatu have low ratios whereas New Zealand has a relatively high ratio. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
     The lower panel of Table 4 reports the basic statistics by major RTAs, including 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the EU, Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).17 
We identify member countries as of 2014, though the sample years in some countries 
may be taken from years before they joined RTAs. Statistics in an RTA do not show 
those in imports among members of that RTA but present those in their total imports. 
From this panel, we can see that the EU has the highest mean tariff exemption ratios 
(96%), followed by AFTA and NAFTA, whose mean ratios are each around 65%. As 
Table 1 shows (i.e., the case of Thailand), the utilization of not only RTA schemes but 
also other tariff exemption schemes such as duty drawbacks for re-exports leads to high 
ratios in AFTA. COMESA, MERCOSUR, and SAFTA have mean tariff exemption 
ratios of approximately 40%. 
 
4.2. Use of the WITS Database 
     In the previous section, we discussed how the weighted average of MFN rates 
affects tariff exemption ratio estimates. In particular, WDI data are computed by 
aggregating import and tariff data at an SITC five-digit level. We can improve this data 
by employing WITS data,18 which provides data aggregated using each country’s tariff 
line-level data.19 However, countries for which data are available in the WITS are 
limited compared to those in the WDI. As a result, we here compute the tariff exemption 
ratio for 83 countries. The results are shown in the column “WITS” in Table 3. Again, 
we report sample year, tariff exemption ratio, and weighted average of MFN rates. We 
                                                   
17 The EU comprises Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. MERCOSUR includes Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. AFTA includes Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
NAFTA includes Canada, Mexico, and the US. COMESA includes Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, Arab Rep., Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zambia. SAFTA includes 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
18 This database is also publicly and freely available after registration. 
19 As mentioned in the previous section, the original source of tariff data in the WDI is also WITS, 
but WDI data are constructed by aggregation at an SITC five-digit level. 
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can see cases of both overestimation and underestimation on the weighted average of 
MFN rates and thus on tariff exemption ratios. On average, the difference in tariff 
exemption ratios between the WDI and WITS cases is just 3%.20  
     Using this improved measure, we also examine time-series changes in tariff 
exemption ratios. The ratios for selected countries during the period 2005–2012 are 
shown in Figure 1. These countries are selected based not only on their data 
availability21 but also in consideration of the significance of the size of their economies, 
geographical diversity, and prevalence of RTAs. Also, except for South Africa, these 
countries do not show significant changes in their share of products with zero MFN 
rates.22 Remember that our tariff exemption ratios measure the preference utilization in 
products with positive MFN rates. Therefore, the time-series changes of tariff 
exemption ratios in these countries can be seen as those of preference utilization rather 
than those of a set of products with positive MFN rates.23 As for other countries, for 
example, countries with tariff exemption ratios equal to or near the value of one in Table 
3, i.e., European countries, have similar levels for other years as well.  
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
The figure shows various interesting changes. The tariff exemption ratio in the US 
changes over time in a range of 0.3 to 0.5. Its decrease may be due to unilateral 
liberalization. In the US, the weighted average of MFN rates (obtained from the WITS) 
drops from 2.7% in 2005 to 2.1% in 2012. Such a reduction decreases the preference 
margin, resulting in firms in RTA partner countries being discouraged from utilizing 
RTA schemes when exporting to the US. While tariff exemption ratios in Chile and 
Norway are rising, those in China and Brazil are gradually decreasing. In particular, the 
rise in Chile’s ratio is significant and is consistent with the fact that Chile is actively 
                                                   
20 Further basic statistics on the difference in tariff exemption ratios between cases of WDI and 
WITS are available in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
21 In particular, the WDI database provides data on imports only since 2005. Thus, if we employ 
other data sources such as UN Comtrade, we can extend the sample years. For some countries, we 
can compute the tariff exemption ratio up to 1988, as data on the weighted average of MFN rates 
have been available in the WDI since that time. In this paper, to maintain consistency of data sources 
with other tables and figures, we do not mix data sources on imports to determine values for such a 
longer period but instead show those since 2005. 
22 Table B2 in Appendix B reports the share of products with zero MFN rates in these countries. 
23 In addition, tariff exemption ratios are likely to change from 2006 to 2007 or from 2011 to 2012 
due to a change in HS versions, i.e., from HS2002 to HS2007 or from HS2007 to HS2012. In 
general, the changes of tariff line structures affect aggregated values of the MFN rates. Thus, a 
change in weighted averages of MFN rates through a change of HS versions will affect tariff 
exemption ratios. 
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increasing the number of RTA partners during the sample period. One of the reasons for 
China’s decrease may be due to a decline in the processing trade, which is one type of 
preferential trade, during the financial crisis (Yu and Tian, 2012). In the cases of 
Australia and Japan, the ratios remain low. South Africa’s ratio is unstable partly 
because of changes in the share of products with zero MFN rates. Such a change 
significantly affects tariff exemption ratio values. In addition, we may doubt the 
accuracy of South Africa’s data on tariff revenues. 
     Next, we conduct quasi-decomposition of total imports. Specifically, we 
decompose total imports into three types. The WITS database provides data on the share 
of imports of zero-MFN-rate products, i.e., duty-free imports, in total imports. We name 
this share “Free.” Multiplying “one minus Free” by the tariff exemption ratio, we obtain 
the share of exemption-basis preferential imports to total imports, as defined in Section 
2. We name this share “Exempted.” As a result, one minus “Free plus Exempted” 
indicates the share of exemption-basis non-preferential imports out of total imports, 
named “Non-exempted.” Importantly, as discussed so far, Exempted is not precisely the 
same as the share of actual preferential imports (i.e., utilization-basis preferential 
imports) out of total imports. Nevertheless, this decomposition of total imports offers 
invaluable information. 
     The results are shown in Figure 2. For reference, we also show the share of the 
tariff line-level products with zero MFN rates in total, data for which are obtained from 
the WITS. This figure tells that, for example, in the US, 40% of total imports are 
duty-free imports, 20% are exemption-basis preferential imports, and 40% are 
exemption-basis non-preferential imports. It also shows that, in Norway, while the tariff 
exemption ratio (WITS) is around 50% as reported in Table 3, 90% of total imports are 
already imported duty free. In contrast, most imports in Chile are exemption-basis 
preferential imports. The magnitude of duty-free imports in Chile is trivial. In short, this 
figure is useful for learning the composition of various types of imports in terms of 
tariff schemes. 
 
===   Figure 2   === 
 
 
5. Correlation with Various Elements 
     This section examines the correlation of tariff exemption ratios with a number of 
elements. For this analysis, we use the tariff exemption ratios in column “WDI” in Table 
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3 in order to capture a wider variation among a larger number of countries.24 We try 
several kinds of variables, for which the basic statistics are listed in Table 5.  
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
5.1. Basic Elements 
We first regress tariff exemption ratios on the share of imports from RTA member 
countries in total imports (Preference share: RTA) by ordinary least squares (OLS).25,26 
It is natural that, ceteris paribus, the higher the share of imports from RTA members, the 
higher the tariff exemption ratio. Information on RTA membership is obtained from the 
regional trade agreement database on the WTO website. Bilateral trade data are from 
UN Comtrade. The result, reported in column (I) in Table 6, shows a significantly 
positive coefficient for this variable. The magnitude of this coefficient, i.e., 0.756, might 
be interpreted as indicating global average rates of RTA utilization when importation 
under RTA schemes is possible.27 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
     Second, we add export intensity, defined as the ratio of total exports to GDP, into 
the estimation equation. As in the above case of Thailand, some countries, particularly 
developing countries, refund import duties for imports used to produce products for 
export. Thus, it is natural that countries actively engaged in such trade have higher tariff 
exemption ratios. However, since it is empirically difficult to precisely measure the 
extent of such trade, we use the export intensity as a proxy. The result is reported in 
column (II). The coefficients for both Preference share and Export intensity are 
                                                   
24 The estimation results using tariff exemption ratios in column “WITS” are reported in Table B3 in 
Appendix B. 
25 For simplicity in interpreting marginal effects, we report only OLS results. However, the 
statistical significance of coefficients in all estimations are not changed even if we estimate all 
models by the fractional logit model, which is a more suitable estimation technique for models in 
which the dependent variable lies at unit intervals [0, 1]. The results are reported in Table B3 in 
Appendix B. 
26 Obviously, RTA schemes cannot necessarily be applied to all products, even when trading among 
RTA member countries. However, for simplicity in computation, we use total imports from RTA 
member countries as the numerator. In addition, for simplicity, imports in both the numerator and 
denominator include those of products with zero MFN rates although the dependent variable, i.e., the 
tariff exemption ratio, does not include the extent of preference utilization for such products. 
27 This magnitude looks reasonable. Table 8 in Keck and Lendle (2012) reported the preference 
utilization ratio by importers (Australia, Canada, EU, or the US) and preferential schemes (RTA or 
GSP). Most cases show preference utilization ratios of more than 80%, although this restricts sample 
products only to those with preference rates lower than MFN rates. 
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estimated to be significantly positive. The magnitude of the former coefficient falls 
slightly to 0.693. The latter result indicates that the tariff exemption ratio is higher in 
export-intensive countries. 
     Third, as in the case of RTAs, we introduce the share of imports from GSP 
beneficiaries out of total imports (Preference share: GSP). 28  GSP beneficiary 
information is obtained from the preferential trade agreement database on the WTO 
website. The results are reported in columns (III) and (IV). The coefficients for both 
preference share from RTA members and export intensity are again estimated to be 
significantly positive. The magnitude of the former’s coefficient is further reduced. 
Coefficients for the preference share from GSP beneficiaries are estimated to be 
positively significant. Its coefficient may again be interpreted as indicating global 
average GSP utilization rates, which are more than 90%.29 
 
5.2. Advanced Elements 
     We further examine the correlation with tariff exemption ratios. Following the 
literature on the determinants of RTA utilization rates, studies on which are listed in the 
introductory section, we first examine the role of preference margin, i.e., the difference 
between preference and MFN rates. It is well known that RTA schemes are more likely 
to be utilized when preference margins are larger. As a proxy for this variable, we work 
with a difference between simple averages of applied tariff rates and MFN rates. Data 
on both types of tariff rate are obtained from the WDI. Since the former kind of tariff 
data in the WDI is based on both MFN rates and RTA rates, this variable will be 
strongly related to preference margins.30 The results are shown in column (I) in Table 7. 
Consistent with the above expectation, we find a positively significant coefficient for 
this new variable. Specifically, a 1 percentage point larger preference margin leads to a 
2.6 percentage point larger tariff exemption ratio. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
     Second, we also examine the correlation of economic development by introducing 
GDP per capita. The results are shown in column (II) in Table 7. The coefficient for 
preference margin is again estimated to be significantly positive, whereas the coefficient 
                                                   
28 As in the case of RTAs, we use import data for all products. Also see footnote 26. 
29 As shown in Table 8 in Keck and Lendle (2012), the preference utilization ratio of GSP when 
importing from its beneficiaries is consistently high in Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US 
Several cases show preference utilization ratios higher than 90%. 
30 However, data on applied tariff rates do not take other preferential rates into account. 
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for GDP per capita is insignificant. The latter result implies that the tariff exemption 
ratio is not necessarily correlated with development stages. Several possible 
explanations can be offered for this insignificant result. On the one hand, GSP schemes 
are generally available when exporting to developed countries. This unilateral 
preference scheme will raise tariff exemption ratios in developed countries. On the other 
hand, tariff exemption schemes other than RTAs and the GSP, such as investment 
promotion or duty drawbacks for re-exports, are likely to be introduced in developing 
countries in order to attract more foreign investment or obtain larger amounts of foreign 
currency. As a result, these two opposite forces may produce an insignificant result in 
GDP per capita. 
 
5.3. Additional Controls 
     Last, we again examine the correlation with the above elements when controlling 
for noise in tariff exemption ratios. As found in equation (4), variation in MFN rates and 
imports across products leads to a gap between the tariff exemption ratio and the 
preferential utilization ratio. Thus, we introduce the following two variables to control 
for such differences. One is a difference between the weighted average of MFN rates 
and the simple average of MFN rates (Weighted-Simple MFN difference), which can 
proxy for variations in imports across products. The other is the share of products with 
MFN rates greater than 15% (Share of high MFN products), which is partly related to 
differences in MFN rates across products. Furthermore, we introduce shares of products 
with specific MFN rates (Share of specific tariff products). As mentioned above, the 
existence of specific rates affects the degree of precision in weighted-average MFN 
rates and thus in tariff exemption ratios. All three variables are derived from the WDI.  
We introduce additional elements. In the previous section, we pointed out the role 
of unilateral trade liberalization in time-series changes in tariff exemption ratios. 
Although our exercise in this section is a cross-country and not a time-series analysis, 
the unilateral trade liberalization may also affect the absolute magnitude of tariff 
exemption ratios. To control for this effect, we introduce the share of products with zero 
MFN rates (Share of zero MFN products), data for which are obtained from UNCTAD. 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations, such a share can only be computed for 
manufactured goods, ores, and metals (SITC (Rev. 3): 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 27 + 28 – 667).31 
                                                   
31 Data on this variable are missing for Japan and Israel for the corresponding year in the tariff 
exemption ratio (2012). Thus, we use the share of zero MFN products in 2011 for Japan and in 2009 
for Israel. In addition, when we restrict sample countries to those for whom WITS data are available, 
namely, when we examine tariff exemption ratios in the column “WITS” in Table 3, we can use the 
data on Share of zero MFN products in all goods including agricultural goods, as shown in Figure 2. 
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We also introduce a dummy variable taking the value of one if government finance data 
in a country are consolidated into one account, and zero otherwise (Consolidated 
dummy). The information for this variable can be derived from the WDI metadata. 
     The results are reported in column (III). The results in the previous variables are 
qualitatively unchanged. Namely, except for GDP per capita, preference shares of RTA 
and GSP, export intensity, and preference margin have positively significant coefficients. 
In particular, the 1 percentage point larger preference margin leads to a 4.7 percentage 
point larger ratio of tariff exemptions. Coefficients for the weighted-simple MFN 
difference and share of high MFN products are estimated to be significantly positive, 
indicating that variations of import and MFN rates across products have a systematic 
influence on tariff exemption ratios. On the other hand, the share of specific tariff 
products, share of products with zero MFN rates, and the consolidated dummy have 
insignificant coefficients and thus do not affect the cross-country differences in our 
tariff exemption ratio.32 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we proposed a new indicator that measures the extent of preference 
utilization. In contrast to the measure usually employed, i.e., the preference utilization 
ratio, our new measure, called the tariff exemption ratio, can be computed by employing 
only publicly available databases such as the WDI database. First, we used detailed data 
on Thailand to demonstrate that our measure is a very good indicator for measuring the 
extent of preference utilization for trade in products with positive MFN rates. Second, 
we demonstrated that computed tariff exemption ratios differed widely across data 
sources. Third, by computing our measure for a large number of countries, we found 
that the tariff exemption ratio differed widely across countries and that its global 
average was approximately 50%. Finally, we also showed that it was positively 
associated with the magnitude of preference margin. 
     The tariff exemption ratio can serve as a strong policy measure. Until now, one 
policy measure on RTAs was the share of imports from RTA partners out of total 
                                                                                                                                                     
The results are reported in Table B3 in Appendix B. 
32 As reported in Table B3 in Appendix B, the results for our main variables are qualitatively 
unchanged even when employing the fractional logit model. However, these are changed when 
estimating the tariff exemption ratios in “WITS” in Table 3. Specifically, the coefficients for 
“Preference share: GSP,” “Export intensity,” and “Share of high MFN products” turn out to be 
insignificant. Those for “Share of specific tariff products” and “Share of zero MFN products” 
become significantly positive and negative, respectively. However, the results for “Preferential share: 
RTA” and “Preference margin,” which are our main variables, are not changed. 
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imports, which does not necessarily reflect the utilization of preferential schemes. 
However, it is highly important to exploit RTA schemes and thus to enhance the 
utilization of preferential schemes. In addition, it may be effective to encourage RTA 
partner countries to facilitate imports under RTA schemes if they have low utilization of 
preferential schemes. To uncover such utilization, we need detailed and specific 
information. Some countries may not have such data readily available, even for their 
own countries. They definitely do not know the utilization of preferential schemes in 
other countries unless such data are disclosed. Against this backdrop, the method 
proposed here for computing tariff exemption ratios requires only publicly available 
data and is technically easy. It is expected that through monitoring the tariff exemption 
ratio in each country, utilization preferences can be enhanced worldwide. 
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Table 1. Preference Utilization Ratios versus Tariff Exemption Ratios: Case of Thailand (Billion THB) 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
MFN rates V E
RTA MFN Others Total Actual Hypoth.
(I)+(II)+(III) (IV)*(V) ((I)+(III))/(IV) 1-((VI)/(VII))
All Products
2007 9 2,981 1,832 4,822 0.041 101 197 0.38 0.49
2008 119 3,252 2,395 5,767 0.040 114 230 0.44 0.50
2009 153 2,695 1,582 4,431 0.045 99 200 0.39 0.50
2010 339 3,448 1,914 5,701 0.048 129 272 0.40 0.52
2011 659 3,828 2,117 6,604 0.047 130 307 0.42 0.58
Positive MFN Products
2007 6 1,312 1,063 2,381 0.083 101 197 0.45 0.49
2008 117 1,426 1,230 2,773 0.083 114 230 0.49 0.50
2009 150 1,146 966 2,262 0.089 99 200 0.49 0.50
2010 323 1,433 1,205 2,961 0.092 129 272 0.52 0.52
2011 615 1,464 1,238 3,317 0.093 130 307 0.56 0.58
Tariff RevenuesImports
 
Source: Authors’ computation 
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Table 2. Sensitivity to Data Sources 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Imports MFN rates V E
Actual Hypoth.
(I)*(II) 1-((III)/(IV))
Case (i): Same as All Products in Table 1
Data source Customs Customs Customs
2007 4,822 0.041 101 197 0.38 0.49
2008 5,767 0.040 114 230 0.44 0.50
2009 4,431 0.045 99 200 0.39 0.50
Case (ii): Same as Positive MFN Products in Table 1
Data source Customs Customs Customs
2007 2,381 0.083 101 197 0.45 0.49
2008 2,773 0.083 114 230 0.49 0.50
2009 2,262 0.089 99 200 0.49 0.50
Case (iii)
Data source WDI WDI WDI
2007 4,487 0.044 87 198 0.56
2008 5,330 0.043 96 230 0.58
2009 4,114 0.049 76 202 0.62
Case (iv)
Data source Comtrade WDI WDI
2007 4,962 0.044 87 219 0.60
2008 5,950 0.043 96 257 0.63
2009 4,586 0.049 76 226 0.66
Tariff Revenues
 
Source: Authors’ computation 
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Table 3. Global Tariff Exemption Ratios  
Year Ratio Tariffs Year Ratio Tariffs
Afghanistan 2012 0.12 6.8
Algeria 2009 0.48 11.3
Angola 2009 0.00 7.4
Antigua and Barbuda 2009 0.58 14.6 2009 0.48 11.7
Armenia 2012 0.03 3.0 2012 0.12 3.4
Australia 2011 0.04 2.5 2011 0.01 2.4
Austria 2012 1.00 2.2 2012 1.00 2.4
Azerbaijan 2012 0.53 6.2
Bahamas, The 2011 0.34 18.9
Bahrain 2011 0.67 6.9 2011 0.56 5.1
Bangladesh 2006 0.30 19.9
Barbados 2007 0.67 19.2 2007 0.64 18.0
Belarus 2012 0.28 4.9
Benin 2011 0.00 15.2
Bhutan 2007 0.96 17.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 1.00 8.8
Brazil 2012 0.30 10.2 2012 0.29 10.0
Bulgaria 2012 0.97 2.2
Burkina Faso 2008 0.00 10.4 2008 0.00 10.5
Cambodia 2008 0.55 11.4 2008 0.55 11.4
Canada 2012 0.64 2.3 2012 0.63 2.2
Chile 2010 0.84 6.0 2010 0.84 6.0
China 2011 0.44 4.6 2011 0.39 4.2
Colombia 2012 0.43 7.7 2012 0.54 9.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2009 0.03 11.0
Congo, Rep. 2007 0.78 14.7
Costa Rica 2010 0.40 4.3 2010 0.34 3.9
Croatia 2012 0.66 4.3 2012 0.65 4.3
Cyprus 2012 0.78 2.2
Czech Republic 2012 1.00 2.2 2012 1.00 2.4
Dominica 2011 0.28 13.9 2007 0.25 13.0
Dominican Republic 2010 0.40 6.7 2010 0.39 6.6
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2009 0.30 8.7 2009 0.35 9.4
El Salvador 2012 0.97 7.3 2012 0.97 6.9
Finland 2005 1.00 3.2
France 2012 0.94 2.2 2012 0.95 2.4
Gambia, The 2008 0.21 14.7
Georgia 2012 0.58 1.7 2012 0.62 1.9
Ghana 2007 0.00 9.9 2009 0.02 9.6
Greece 2011 1.00 2.4 2011 1.00 2.4
Grenada 2012 0.19 12.8 2008 0.15 12.8
Guatemala 2012 0.75 7.5 2012 0.64 5.2
WDI WITS
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Table 3. Global Tariff Exemption Ratios (Cont.) 
Year Ratio Tariffs Year Ratio Tariffs
Honduras 2009 0.71 6.5 2009 0.70 6.3
Hungary 2012 0.98 2.2 2012 0.98 2.4
Iceland 2012 0.41 2.2 2011 0.41 2.3
India 2009 0.17 8.4 2009 0.32 10.1
Indonesia 2007 0.55 5.4 2007 0.34 3.7
Ireland 2012 0.97 2.2 2012 0.97 2.4
Israel 2012 0.55 2.1 2012 0.63 2.5
Jamaica 2011 0.59 9.8 2011 0.59 9.6
Japan 2012 0.09 1.5 2012 0.08 1.5
Jordan 2009 0.66 8.9 2009 0.65 8.7
Kenya 2012 0.65 11.2 2010 0.34 7.0
Korea, Rep. 2010 0.74 8.8 2010 0.65 6.5
Kuwait 2012 0.07 4.4 2012 0.00 4.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2012 0.01 4.1 2012 0.02 4.1
Lao PDR 2008 0.58 13.2
Latvia 2012 0.88 2.2
Lebanon 2007 0.43 5.7
Luxembourg 2012 1.00 2.2 2012 1.00 2.4
Macedonia, FYR 2012 0.76 6.4 2011 0.77 6.3
Malaysia 2009 0.91 5.8 2008 0.88 4.3
Maldives 2009 0.36 20.8 2009 0.33 20.1
Mali 2011 0.14 10.2 2011 0.14 10.1
Malta 2012 1.00 2.2
Mauritius 2011 0.05 1.2 2010 0.00 1.2
Mexico 2010 0.89 6.2 2010 0.88 5.6
Moldova 2012 0.41 3.7 2012 0.31 3.1
Morocco 2012 0.71 9.2 2012 0.73 9.9
Mozambique 2010 0.56 7.9 2010 0.51 7.2
Nepal 2012 0.33 12.0 2012 0.31 11.7
New Zealand 2006 0.55 10.3 2006 0.18 3.4
Nicaragua 2010 0.78 5.7 2010 0.76 5.3
Norway 2012 0.05 0.6 2012 0.44 1.0
Oman 2012 0.45 4.6 2009 0.44 4.6
Pakistan 2005 0.26 12.2 2005 0.26 12.2
Paraguay 2012 0.57 7.8 2011 0.47 6.6
Peru 2011 0.27 1.9 2010 0.21 2.8
Poland 2012 0.98 2.2 2012 0.98 2.4
Portugal 2012 1.00 2.2
Romania 2012 0.85 2.2 2012 0.86 2.4
Russian Federation 2005 0.19 9.6
Rwanda 2012 0.64 12.9 2011 0.66 12.2
Senegal 2011 0.04 8.8 2011 0.06 9.0
WDI WITS
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Table 3. Global Tariff Exemption Ratios (Cont.) 
Year Ratio Tariffs Year Ratio Tariffs
Seychelles 2007 0.80 28.3
Sierra Leone 2012 0.73 9.9
Singapore 2007 0.78 0.0
Slovak Republic 2012 1.00 2.2 2012 1.00 2.4
Slovenia 2012 0.96 2.2 2012 0.97 2.4
South Africa 2012 0.29 5.7 2012 0.25 5.3
Spain 2012 0.98 2.2 2012 0.98 2.4
Sri Lanka 2011 0.40 6.3 2011 0.42 6.5
St. Kitts and Nevis 2011 0.05 13.1 2011 0.09 13.7
St. Lucia 2007 0.00 11.6
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2007 0.51 11.6 2007 0.52 11.8
Suriname 2010 0.52 11.9 2010 0.47 10.8
Sweden 2007 0.96 3.2 2007 0.96 2.8
Switzerland 2009 0.81 2.3
Tanzania 2012 0.46 11.7 2012 0.22 8.0
Thailand 2009 0.62 4.9 2009 0.60 4.8
Togo 2010 0.40 14.5 2010 0.14 10.1
Trinidad and Tobago 2008 0.65 10.3 2008 0.12 4.1
Tunisia 2008 0.79 16.0 2008 0.79 16.0
Turkey 2011 0.77 5.2 2011 0.75 4.9
Uganda 2012 0.48 9.1 2011 0.50 8.5
Ukraine 2012 0.26 2.6 2012 0.32 2.8
United Kingdom 2009 0.98 2.8 2009 0.98 2.8
United States 2012 0.41 2.5 2012 0.31 2.1
Uruguay 2012 0.40 7.9 2012 0.43 8.2
Vanuatu 2009 0.00 18.6
Venezuela, RB 2005 0.38 13.6
Zambia 2009 0.31 8.6 2008 0.24 9.1
WDI WITS
 
Source: Authors’ computation, WDI, and WITS 
Note: “Tariffs” indicates the weighted average of MFN rates (%). Data from WDI are used in the 
column “WDI” and data from WITS in the column “WITS.” 
 
  
28 
 
Table 4. Tariff Exemption Ratios in Country Groupings 
N Mean S.D. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
World 112 0.5352 0.3196 0 0.2946 0.5508 0.7885 1
By Regions
Africa 24 0.3688 0.2920 0 0.0452 0.3530 0.6456 0.8009
East/Southeast Asia 9 0.5853 0.2352 0.0874 0.5490 0.5823 0.7443 0.9110
South/West Asia 18 0.3832 0.2535 0.0124 0.1739 0.3799 0.5526 0.9603
Europe 31 0.8003 0.2859 0.0458 0.7599 0.9634 0.9986 1
North America 2 0.5255 0.1671 0.4073 0.4073 0.5255 0.6436 0.6436
Latin America 25 0.4992 0.2510 0 0.3397 0.5148 0.6674 0.9693
Pacific 3 0.1952 0.3057 0 0 0.0381 0.5476 0.5476
By RTAs
AFTA 6 0.6660 0.1479 0.5490 0.5547 0.5990 0.7832 0.9110
COMESA 8 0.4074 0.2845 0.0309 0.1746 0.3933 0.6456 0.8009
EU 21 0.9467 0.0876 0.6567 0.9614 0.9773 0.9990 1
MERCOSUR 4 0.4135 0.1131 0.3020 0.3395 0.3909 0.4875 0.5702
NAFTA 3 0.6462 0.2402 0.4073 0.4073 0.6436 0.8876 0.8876
SAFTA 8 0.3630 0.2591 0.1172 0.2163 0.3171 0.3799 0.9603  
Source: Authors’ computation 
Note: This table reports country–group tariff exemption ratio averages computed using WDI data on the weighted average of MFN rates. 
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Table 5. Basic Statistics for Regressions 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tariff exemption ratio 112 0.535 0.320 0 1
Preference share: RTA 112 0.481 0.260 0 0.991
Preference share: GSP 112 0.054 0.100 0.000 0.351
Export intensity 112 0.300 0.231 0.030 1.733
Preference margin 112 0.009 0.019 -0.040 0.084
ln GDP per capita 112 8.709 1.454 5.710 11.551
Weighted-Simple MFN difference 112 -0.009 0.037 -0.170 0.212
Share of high MFN products 112 0.199 0.214 0 0.909
Share of specific tariff products 112 0.028 0.045 0 0.301
Share of zero MFN products 112 0.275 0.244 0 1.000
Consolidated dummy 112 0.625 0.486 0 1  
Source: Authors’ computation 
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Table 6. Correlation with Basic Elements 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Preference share: RTA 0.756*** 0.693*** 0.643*** 0.584***
[0.103] [0.108] [0.109] [0.112]
Preference share: GSP 0.962*** 0.945***
[0.230] [0.222]
Export intensity 0.265** 0.253**
[0.120] [0.102]
Constant 0.172*** 0.122** 0.174*** 0.127**
[0.059] [0.057] [0.060] [0.057]
Number of observations 112 112 112 112
R-squared 0.3800 0.4139 0.4624 0.4934  
Note: The dependent variable is the tariff exemption ratio computed using WDI data on the 
weighted average of MFN rates. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Correlation with Advanced Elements 
(I) (II) (III)
Preference share: RTA 0.490*** 0.482*** 0.526***
[0.129] [0.128] [0.121]
Preference share: GSP 0.808*** 0.760*** 0.814***
[0.246] [0.253] [0.283]
Export intensity 0.255*** 0.247** 0.282***
[0.098] [0.103] [0.098]
Preference margin 2.579* 2.646* 4.700***
[1.550] [1.512] [1.645]
ln GDP per capita 0.007 0.013
[0.020] [0.021]
Weighted-Simple MFN difference 2.064***
[0.626]
Share of high MFN products 0.254**
[0.128]
Share of specific tariff products -0.274
[0.471]
Share of zero MFN products -0.058
[0.116]
Consolidated dummy 0.043
[0.052]
Constant 0.155*** 0.102 -0.039
[0.059] [0.165] [0.193]
Number of observations 112 112 112
R-squared 0.5067 0.5074 0.5566  
Note: The dependent variable is the tariff exemption ratio computed using WDI data on the 
weighted average of MFN rates. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Trends in Tariff Exemption Ratios for Selected Countries 
 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Note: In this figure, we employ the tariff exemption ratio computed using WITS data on the weighted average of MFN rates. 
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Figure 2. Quasi-Decomposition of Total Imports 
  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Note: In this figure, we employ the tariff exemption ratio computed using WITS data on the weighted average of MFN rates. “Free” indicates the share of 
imports of products with zero MFN rates out of total imports. “Exempted” and “Non-exempted” refer to the shares of the exemption-basis preferential and 
non-preferential imports out of total imports, respectively. “Share of Free TL” is the share of the tariff line-level products with zero MFN rates in total.  
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Appendix A. Equivalence of Equations (2) and (5) 
 
In this appendix, we demonstrate that equation (2) is equivalent to equation (5). 
The weighted average of MFN rates can be defined as follows: 
𝑊𝑅𝐷𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑅𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑅 𝑇𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑇𝑡𝑅𝑅 ≡� �� 𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃
∑ (𝐼𝑘𝑀 + 𝐼𝑘𝑃)𝑘 � ∙ 𝑡𝑖𝑀�𝑖= � �(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃) ∙ 𝑡𝑖𝑀
∑ (𝐼𝑘𝑀 + 𝐼𝑘𝑃)𝑘 �𝑖 = ∑ {𝑡𝑖𝑀(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃)}𝑖∑ (𝐼𝑘𝑀 + 𝐼𝑘𝑃)𝑘 . 
Therefore, the denominator in the second term in equation (5) can be summarized as 
follows: (𝑊𝑅𝐷𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑅𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑅 𝑇𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑇𝑡𝑅𝑅) × (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝑓𝐼𝑇𝑓𝑡𝑅)= ∑ {𝑡𝑖𝑀(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃)}𝑖
∑ (𝐼𝑘𝑀 + 𝐼𝑘𝑃)𝑘 × � (𝐼𝑘𝑀 + 𝐼𝑘𝑃)𝑘 = � 𝑡𝑖𝑀(𝐼𝑖𝑀 + 𝐼𝑖𝑃)𝑖  
This term is exactly the same as the denominator in the second term in equation (2). 
Furthermore, by definition, the numerator in the second term in equation (2) is the 
same as “Total Revenues from Import Duties,” which is the numerator in the second 
term in equation (5). As a result, equation (5) is equivalent to equation (2). 
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Appendix B. Several Additional Tables 
 
Table B1. Difference in Tariff Exemption Ratios According to Data Sources 
Difference
N 83
Mean 0.027
S.D. 0.107
Min -0.398
p25 -0.003
p50 0.005
p75 0.047
Max 0.531  
Note: This table reports various statistics on the difference between tariff exemption ratios based on 
WDI and WITS data. 
 
 
Table B2. Share of Products with Zero MFN Rates 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia 48% 48% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
Brazil 7.1% 7.0% 7.1% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 8.2%
Chile 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
China 8.5% 8.6% 8.5% 8.5% 8.2% 8.4% 9.3%
Japan 41% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 41%
Norway 84% 84% 83% 84% 84% 84% 84%
South Africa 54% 54% 56% 57% 56% 56%
United States 41% 41% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40%  
Source: WITS. 
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Table B3. Fractional Logit Model 
WDI WITS
Preference share: RTA 2.397*** 3.056***
[0.607] [0.615]
Preference share: GSP 4.434** 1.568
[1.743] [1.789]
Export intensity 1.536*** 1.151
[0.587] [0.785]
Preference margin 23.034*** 19.167**
[8.749] [9.625]
ln GDP per capita 0.044 -0.102
[0.106] [0.114]
Weighted-Simple MFN difference 9.989*** 15.645**
[3.066] [6.594]
Share of high MFN products 1.210** 0.581
[0.569] [0.809]
Share of specific tariff products -1.592 13.628***
[2.629] [5.168]
Share of zero MFN products -0.315 -1.050*
[0.569] [0.623]
Consolidated dummy 0.229 0.441
[0.239] [0.323]
Number of observations 112 83
Log pseudolikelihood -47.40 -33.91  
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. The dependent variables in columns “WDI” and “WITS” are tariff exemption 
ratios computed by employing the data on the weighted average of MFN rates from WDI and 
WITS, respectively. 
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Figure B1. Kernel Density of Tariff Exemption Ratio 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: The tariff exemption ratio lies in the unit interval, i.e., [0, 1]. 
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